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Abstract 
Droit de Suite (DDS), or the Artist’s Resale Royalty, is a law enforced in the European Union that 
requires a royalty fee to be paid to an original artist every time a painting is resold. Those in favor 
of a royalty believe that an artist should be able to take part in the success of his or her work after 
the first sale, as pieces often appreciate significantly in value in subsequent sales. A study on the 
effect of DDS on markets can show whether this law is an appropriate response to the moral issue.  
 
This paper features unique data of Post-War and Contemporary paintings sold between 2004 and 
2015 by Christie’s. This paper measures the effect of DDS on the art market by tracking the 
displacement of sales and a depression in prices. I estimate an equation predicting art prices, and 
then I examine the effect of DDS on this equation. My results suggest that, first, provenance 
significantly contributes to value; second, that there is evidence of the “afternoon” effect in art 
auctions; third, that DDS may impact works of lower value negatively; and, finally, that DDS does 
not affect the very high end of the market. These results enforce the theory that a royalty affects 
the lower end of the market, while expensive works absorb the cost of the royalty.  
 
 
Introduction 
The story of Droit de Suite (DDS) often begins with artist Robert Rauschenberg’s notorious 
outbreak at the Sotheby’s auction house in 1973. Rauschenberg watched Robert and Ethel Scull, 
who had purchased his work Thaw for $900, resell it for $85,000. Afterwards, Rauschenberg 
himself approached them angrily and said that he had done the work while they had reaped the 
enormous profits.  
The Scull’s sale of their collection was not merely a sale by a couple who had depleted 
their funds; it represented the financial value and liquidity of art. Collectors could directly see their 
art purchase as a consumption good but also as an investment or a claim on future wealth. Here, I 
examine the question of who is entitled to acquire these incredible returns.  DDS attempts to shift 
those returns to the artist by shifting property rights from the owner to the artist.  
 Even before Rauschenberg’s furious reaction, France had laws attempting to protect artists. 
DDS originated in France in the 1920s. DDS, also known as the Artist’s Resale Right, grants a 
percentage of resale revenue to the original artist. Therefore, each time a painting is resold by an 
art market professional, the original artist holds the right to receive a portion of the total sale price. 
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The law has been in effect in many countries over the past few decades, though specifics in the 
law and levels of commitment vary. The law was passed across European Union countries in 2001 
and came into effect in 2006 for living artists. In 2012 DDS was extended to cover 70 years after 
the artists’ deaths. The artist also must be an EU national or resident. Although a royalty has not 
been adopted by the US, legislatures have debated the law time and time again.  
The issue of a resale royalty was first raised on moral grounds. Those in favor of a law 
applicative to the visual industry believe that an artist should be able to take part in the success of 
his or her work after the first sale, where works often appreciate in value. Although the law is 
meant to benefit artists, a study on the effect of the royalty on markets can show whether this law 
is the correct response to the moral issue. The impact on the art market reveals whether a royalty 
financially benefits artists or actually depresses the markets by decreasing prices and displacing 
sales. To study this effect, I will compare the Postwar and Contemporary paintings market in 
London, New York City, Paris, and Amsterdam. The first portion of this paper will focus on the 
movement of sales across cities as sellers attempt to evade the law, and the second on the 
depression of prices in markets subject to DDS.  
 
Previous Literature: Analysis on Movement of Sales and International Competition 
Although the moral motivation behind DDS is sensible, many argue that a resale royalty 
may not be the solution. The primary concern in the EU is that there would be a diversion of sales 
to other countries without a royalty, such as their main competitors US and China. The British Art 
Market Federation (TBAMF) has recently (2014) focused on the economic impact of DDS by 
tracking the movement of sales. When looking at the market for EU living artists who would be 
subject to DDS, they found a decline in growth relative to the US and Chinese markets, both of 
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which grew rapidly after the 2009 art market crash. A simultaneous decline in other EU countries 
suggests that the British slump is correlated with growth in non-DDS countries (McAndrew, 2014, 
p. 13).  Additionally, the EU “Heir’s Market” (deceased artists up to 70 years after their death), 
shows even more dramatic movement. In 2011, the U.K was the largest market in the heir’s sector. 
A year later, when the law began to cover deceased artists, the U.K experienced a contraction of 
19% while the U.S witnessed growth of 36%, and China 73% (McAndrew, 2014, p. 15).  
 TBAMF further tracked market displacement by focusing on markets for different periods 
of art. Since the artists of the Post-War and Contemporary Art market are more likely to be alive, 
the sector is most directly affected by DDS. Between the years 2010 and 2013, sales for Modern 
and Post-War and Contemporary art (by artists born after 1875 in this study) declined while Old 
Masters, Impressionists, and Post-Impressionists either gained or remained stable (Art Economics, 
2014). Meanwhile, the US and China’s shares of Post-War and Contemporary art have grown after 
2009. Market trends show that the UK’s status as an international art hub is declining. The 
weakening of markets that are associated with DDS and the stable condition of other markets 
provide reason to believe that DDS is correlated with the diversion of sales. 
 
Previous Literature: A Theoretical Analysis 
A key argument against DDS is that it would result in a reduced price upon every sale of a 
work liable. Randall K. Filer (1984) composed a theoretical analysis of DDS where he explained 
that ownership of art is equivalent to ownership of a bundle of property rights (p. 13). When there 
is a royalty imposed, the buyer of art receives only a portion of the property rights, while a 
percentage remains with the artist. Therefore, the price of the work will decrease accordingly, and 
the artist trades current income (the loss incurred initially) for future income (the gain from the 
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royalty). The buyer is also placed in a substandard position, since he or she will only receive a 
partial bundle of property rights. The resale royalty may actually place the artist at a disadvantage 
because the future gain is not guaranteed and is dependent on resale. The Coase Theorem of 
economics states that consumption decisions are independent of the distribution of property rights, 
that it relies on buyers and sellers bargaining over rights (Filer, 1984, p. 18). Legislatures believe 
that non-transferable rights protect artists given their inferior bargaining power. DDS makes it 
impossible for artists to sell their rights even if they wanted to.  
Victor Ginsburgh (2006) explains that DDS would force the artist to invest in the future 
success of his work, and if faced with the choice, the artist may choose not to opt in for a royalty 
(Ginsburgh, 2006, p. 63). A loss in current income may lead to artists quitting, consequently 
defeating one of the original purposes of DDS—to encourage creativity through economic 
incentives. Furthermore, artists who would opt in are more likely to be established artists who 
already know the marketability of their work. Therefore, DDS tends to favor more established 
artists as opposed to lesser known artists (p. 70).  
 
Previous Literature: Empirical Work 
Although economic theory and market trends develop a case against DDS, there is a lack 
of empirical evidence.   Nauro F. Campos and Renata Leite Barbosa (2008) point out that it is 
difficult to precisely study the art market using economic models. There are important differences 
between art products and other commodities. Art is a unique product because it performs similarly 
to the behavior of financial assets while also acting as a consumption good. Paintings are frequently 
resold and therefore can be viewed as “a store of wealth or capital gain” (p. 28).  
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Campos and Barbosa also point out that it is difficult to study the pricing of art because art 
is a heavily differentiated product in comparison to other commodities (p. 31). Even if two works 
seem to be copies, art depends on time and place relationships that make every creation singular. 
Works of art typically appreciate in value due to characteristics beyond the physical piece, such as 
provenance, attributes related to the previous ownership, and origin of the work. By applying 
hedonic price models to art, Campos and Barbosa found that provenance is in fact significant when 
pricing art (p. 46). These variables include whether a work was exhibited, included in an art book, 
whether it was from a public or private collection, and whether it was included in a catalogue 
raisonne. Campos’s and Barbosa’s primary critique of electronic databases is that they do not 
include such variables, therefore making price models vulnerable to heterogeneity and omitted 
variable bias.  
Despite Campos and Barbosa’s argument respecting the difficulty of empirically 
measuring the price of art, Chanont Baternghansa and Kathryn Graddy (2011) studied the impact 
of DDS on auction sales by studying such sales in the years leading up to the law’s implementation 
(1997 – 2007). They compared relative changes in countries that have a resale royalty fee (i.e. 
France and Germany), and countries that do not (i.e. US and Switzerland). They split the sample 
between works liable in the UK and works that were not. They regressed the natural log of price 
on various attributes, country fixed effects, and time dummy variables. When looking at the change 
in price in the UK relative to the change in non-DDS countries, they found that the average price 
growth per year in the DDS countries yielded positive results (p. 91). Therefore, Baternghansa and 
Graddy conclude the law had no effect. The only instance in which they found a depression in 
prices in the works liable to DDS was when splitting the sample between artists below the age of 
65 and above (p. 94). This outcome is consistent with the idea that DDS is lowering the price of 
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paintings by younger artists at an auction.  Baternghansa and Graddy’s results may be understated 
because they only study the years before and after the directive in 2001, as opposed to the law’s 
implementation in 2006.  
 
Data 
This study focuses on the international art market because of the lack of transparency in 
the primary and secondary market. The international market boasts the sales of the most 
established artists and “master” works and functions exclusively on the auction level. It is 
dominated by Christie’s and Sotheby’s auction houses; together they hold 42 percent of the global 
art auction market (Baker & Kaakina, 2015). The latter markets consist of both lesser known artists 
and established artists sold by gallerists. Although the primary and secondary markets also fall 
under the jurisdiction of DDS, sales information from galleries are protected due to client 
confidentiality. Moreover, it is well known among art dealers that money alone cannot buy the 
best art. Aside from producing profit, dealers prioritize developing and maintaining the reputation 
of an artist. For example, a dealer may sell at a lower price to a more esteemed collector because 
the collector adds value to the brand of the artist. Since this phenomenon is impossible in an auction 
house, the international market is less susceptible to such confounding events.  
Art auctions practice ascending price format, in which bidding starts low and the auctioneer 
subsequently calls out higher and higher prices. The work is finally sold at the “hammer price.” If 
the work does not exceed the reserve price, the work is said to be “bought in” and is not sold at 
that time. Works are sold in “lots,” typically one work per lot. This dataset only includes lots that 
were sold.  
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This paper features auction data from the Christie’s salesrooms in New York City, London, 
Amsterdam, and Paris between the years 2004 and 2015, and comprising about 1500 paintings 
randomly selected from 5970 observations from the Artnet database. In addition to the data from 
Artnet, more extensive research on the provenance of each painting is hand-coded directly from 
the auction catalogue produced by Christie’s before the sale. The buyer has access to all 
information in the catalogue prior to the sale. While Baternghansa and Graddy only include the 
physical and easily observable characteristics of art such as size and medium, the hand-coded data 
applied here reduces exposure to omitted variable bias by including provenance variables similar 
to those outlined by Campos and Barbosa.  
The time period used here, 2004-2015, is also expected to better reflect the impact of the 
law in comparison to Baternghansa and Graddy, who studied 1997-2007. Although their data set 
offers a longer period and larger sample size, they only measure years before and after the directive 
in 2001 with the expectation that buyers will adjust their demand in anticipation of the actual 
passing of law in 2006.  
I have restricted the dataset to minimize price heterogeneity, by limiting the dataset to 
paintings. Within paintings, I focus on Post-War and Contemporary art as it is most relevant to the 
law, because the artists are more likely to be alive or recently passed; the Post-War movement 
began around 1945 and the Contemporary follows until the present. Major Post-War and 
Contemporary art sales occur in various cities typically twice a year, summer and winter. Rather 
than use seasonal dummies to control for seasonal price variations, this paper is restricted to winter 
sales because winter offers the most consistent Post-War and Contemporary auctions across the 
four cities; New York City, London, Amsterdam, and Paris all had yearly winter sales. In addition, 
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works that were resold in a Christie’s winter auction room were eliminated. There were ten such 
paintings. 
Although New York City, London, Amsterdam, and Paris follow similar timelines in Post-
War and Contemporary winter auctions sales, Paris and Amsterdam sales deviate slightly. 
Amsterdam only began Post-War and Contemporary art sales in 2009. Prior to 2009, the data set 
includes the auctions called “20th Century Art” (20th century art additionally includes Modern and 
Impressionist art). Since the works comprise more paintings by artists who died more than 70 years 
before the time of sale, the results in Amsterdam may be understated. Paris data show the reverse. 
Starting in 2010, sales in December only included auctions labeled Contemporary Art. As a result, 
the data set includes more recent works and younger artists. 
In addition, the cities’ variation in law may produce interesting results. While the UK and 
the Netherlands follow similar timelines, France passed the law in 1920 and has allowed for 
compensation up to 70 years past the artist’s death. Another discrepancy specific to Paris is that 
the law states that the burden must be borne by the seller rather than the buyer, therefore the buyer’s 
decision is less likely to be affected. Also, the Parisian catalogue does not indicate works liable to 
DDS (Art Media Agency, 2012). Other than a short time period in the state of California, the U.S. 
has yet to adopt a law. Additionally, the highest relative number of sales in each country is that of 
the artist who shares their nationality. For example, London features the highest amount of British 
artists and therefore has a large set of lots liable to DDS.  
Of the 1500 observations, NYC has the largest set in both sales and value as shown in 
Table 1. New York sales cover 533 and represent 54.0 percent of sales by value. The second largest 
market in this set and the third globally is the UK. London represents 346 of sales and 39.0 percent 
by value. These top-tier art centers are compared to smaller markets in Paris and Amsterdam. Paris 
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consists of 246 works and Amsterdam 311. The lower amount of sales is also reflected in the value 
of the works. Average prices are shown in Table 2. 
Country Number of 
Sales  
Percentage by 
Value of Sales 
NYC 533 54.0 
London 346 39.0 
Amsterdam 311 1.6 
Paris 246 5.1 
Table 1. 
Country Post - Directive 
2004-2005 
Post -
Implementation 
2006 - 2011 
Post - Revision 
2012 - 2015 
NYC 527,811 676,834 1,032,311 
London  181,782 541,600 1,720,844 
Paris 53,315 144,558 246,673 
Amsterdam  19,084 35,534 56,350 
Table 2. 
Cities’ markets differ in their exposure to DDS due to the different average sales. Since, 
Amsterdam and Paris comprise markets with lower value sales, they are more likely to be affected 
by the law. DDS is expected to be absorbed at the high end of the market because the royalty 
cannot exceed £12,500 in the UK and is only 0.25 percent for works above 500,000, which is 
miniscule when looking at multimillion dollar sales (Banternghansa & Graddy, 2011, p. 83). The 
royalty is compared to a buyers’ premium of 20% percent for sales between £50,000 and 
£1,000,000 at the Christie’s London salesroom (a buyer’s premium is the percentage of sale paid 
by the buyer to the seller in addition to the hammer price). Works of lower value are therefore 
more likely to experience a depression in prices. On the other hand, high value works are more 
prone to displacement of sales because of their exposure to international competition. A report by 
TBAMF (2011) showed that a royalty fee exceeds estimated shipping and handling costs for works 
above €40,000, diverting high value sales to non-DDS competitors (p. 14). This estimation is 
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understated because it does not include import taxes that would eventually be borne by a buyer in 
the UK.  
 
Methodology 
This study uses a difference-in-difference approach by measuring the impact of the changes 
in law in both 2006 and 2012 in the London and Amsterdam relative to Paris and New York City 
which feature steady policies. The methodology assumes common trend before the law 
implementation so that any change in London or Amsterdam markets can be attributed to the law. 
If the common trend is rejected the mean of the residuals will be nonzero. Using visual estimation 
the common trend holds for the full sample because there is no trend observed in the residuals. 
However, in the cheap and expensive samples New York City is trending downward.  The negative 
trend of the main control series (New York) may make it difficult to detect any negative effect of 
the 2012 changes to the DDS law. 
Pitc = 0 + 1CHARACHTERISTICSi + 2TIMEt+3CITYc + 4law06 + 5law12 + 
6Years06LAmLaw06 + 7Years12LAmLaw012 + 8Years06LAm + 9LAmLaw06+ 
10Years06Law06 + 11Years12LAm + 12LAmLaw12 + 13Years12Law12+ Eitc 
The regression used here represents price regressed on various characteristics of the work 
for painting i at time t in city c. Art work controls include size, medium, subject matter and a 
dummy for “signed,” which is expected to positively affect price (Table 3). A signed work of art 
indicates authenticity which is one of the largest risks when buying art. Other independent 
variables include provenance variables. The exhibited variables represent a scale for elite 
museums. If the museum was prestigious the “exhibited 2” dummy took a value of one. A work 
displayed at a lower leveled museum is reflected in “exhibited 1.” Most of the data set is abstract, 
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consistent with the Post-War and Contemporary movements in which they were created. Also, the 
set of subject matter dummies are non-excludable because many works reflect more than one. For 
example, Andy Warhol famously painted in an abstract style, though his paintings resembled 
portraits and were clearly titled. 
Physical Oil, acrylic, canvas, size signed, portrait, still life, abstract, landscape, writing, 
animal 
Auction 
Effect 
Lot number 
Artist  Dead 
Provenance Catalogue Raissone, artbook, exhibited1, exhibited2, private collection, public 
collection 
Table 3. Variables 
 The impact of the law is measured by interacting the attributes of a DDS eligible work. 
These impact variables highlighted represent the time the law was in effect, whether the work was 
sold in London or Amsterdam (“LAm” is equivalent to the sum of the London and Amsterdam 
dummy variables), and an artist that was alive and European. Together, these characteristics make 
the work liable to Law06. Law12 is similar except it represents deceased artists. A positive 
estimated coefficient would indicate that those works liable for DDS price grow relatively more 
than the works that are not liable after the law is implemented. Conversely, a negative estimated 
coefficient would suggest that works subject to DDS are priced low relative to works not liable.   
I estimated three versions of  the model. I first estimated the model with the full sample 
size. Then, to test the the theory that lower value sales are impacted more heavily than larger sales, 
I ran two additional regressions for cheap and expensive works. The sample is split into “Cheap” 
for works less that 50,000, and “Expensive” for works that sold between 50,000 and 1,000,000. 
50,000 dollars is chosen as the benchmark for expensive works because a royalty fee exceeds 
estimated shipping and handling costs for works above €40,000—approximately 50,000 dollars 
with the addition of import taxes. Therefore, a work of 50,000 dollars or more is predicted be more 
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vulnerable to being displaced and sold in a country without DDS. Works above 1,000,000 were 
excluded because of their small percentage relative to the sample size.  
 
Results and Analysis 
 The results for the hedonic price models are depicted in Appendix 1. The first table 
represents the full sample size, the second “Cheap,” the third “Expensive.” The model for cheap 
works accounted for 26% variation in price, the most relative to other samples. The size of the 
painting remained significant in every model. These finding enforce an accepted theory among art 
sellers that larger paintings reap higher prices. However, the level of significance is smaller in 
higher value works revealing that outstandingly expensive paintings’ success is due to attributes 
other than size.  
A majority of the provenance characteristics hand-coded from auction catalogues show 
positive results. There is only one instance in which the “exhibited1” variable shows a negative 
contribution, but it is not significant. These findings support the idea that the variation in price of 
art works is not only due to the physical attributes of the work, but also due to the origins and 
previous market performance of the work. The only variable which maintains a negative 
magnitude is lot number. It is widely held that the later a good is sold in an auction, the lower the 
price. Campos and Barbosa (2008) test the “afternoon effect” in the Latin American art market 
and find significantly negative results for the lot number (p.48). This study shows similar results 
for the afternoon effect in the Post-War and Contemporary art market. In the model for cheap 
works, significance of lot number disappears and the negative effect reverses. This occurrence may 
be because works of very high value are usually sold within the first 100 lots. 
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 The following model, shown in Appendix 2, tests the impact of the law by addressing the 
works liable through the interaction terms. There is almost no significance in these coefficients 
(highlighted), however, the discrepancy in magnitude between samples call for an examination. 
The full sample (labelled “all”) shows positive results and of extremely high magnitude which 
suggests DDS works sell for higher prices relative to non-DDS works in both 2006 and 2012. One 
possible explanation is that works of art by EU nationals sold in the EU earn higher prices because 
of the patriotic inclinations of buyers. A buyer may be willing to pay a higher premium in order to 
support a painting of their home country. When splitting the sample into cheap and expensive and 
excluding works over 1 million dollars, the impact changes. Years06LAmLaw06 remains positive 
but dramatically reduces in magnitude in the “cheap” sample while the “expensive” sample 
displays a negative magnitude. The coefficient on Years12LAmLaw12, representative of the 
period after the extension of the law to the heir’s market, loses significance when splitting the 
sample. The estimated coefficient in the cheap sample becomes negative. The sample for 
expensive works features a positive coefficient.  
The impact of DDS in the UK may be understated in these results since the model does not 
account for anticipatory effects. In 2001 the directive was introduced and in 2006 it was 
implemented for qualified living artists. Since buyers were made aware of the impending royalty, 
it is possible that buyers may have already accounted for the economic impact prior to the 
implementation date in 2006. Although a collector in 2001 was not paying a fee, their willingness 
to pay may have been reduced since they would expect to sell the art work for less in the future 
should their purchased work be liable. Similarly, the law extension in 2012 was discussed prior to 
its implementation and may have affected the buyer’s decisions beforehand.  
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Baternghansa and Graddy (2011) also note that results may be understated because of the 
possibility of a future movement of sale. The law not only results in the buyer paying the royalty 
when purchasing the product, but, when looking to resell, the now-owner may also have to bear a 
depressed price. If a buyer plans on moving a work liable in the UK to the US after purchase, he 
or she only bears the impact once, and not in the following transactions (p. 86). The reverse is also 
possible. If a prospective buyer of a EU painting buys in the US but plans to sell in the UK, he or 
she may reduce their willingness to pay in anticipation of a future liability. The model used here 
does not account for this eventuality. 
Although works of art by American artists sold in the EU are not liable, the effect of the 
law may spillover to works of art by American artists sold in London and Amsterdam. The impact 
variables used here depict the change in price relative to non-DDS works. If non-DDS works are 
also negatively impacted, then a negative result for DDS works may disappear completely from 
the impact variables. Lastly, the sample used only captures the very high end of the international 
market because of the opacity in the primary and secondary market. The latter markets are more 
vulnerable to the law because they comprise works of lower value.  
 
Future Studies and Conclusion 
Although it is important to limit data according to certain criteria when studying art in order 
to reduce heterogeneity, a more conclusive data set may better account for the issues mentioned 
above. A larger data set would allow for excluding works by an artist who shares a nationality with 
the city of sale. For example, a painting by a British artist would be excluded from the sample in 
order to observe whether a British work sold in London gains a higher price. The impact variables 
may show more negative and significant results compared to estimations found here.  
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It is also noted here that cheaper works appear to be more negatively affected. The 
estimated coefficient in the “Cheap” sample is negative though not precisely estimated. I 
hypothesize that this may be because the royalty fee is less likely to be absorbed by the market. 
However, more conclusive data may prove more precise outcomes. A study on the primary and 
the secondary market which feature lower prices is nearly impossible because of the opacity of the 
market. Nevertheless, case studies on second tier galleries may provide a new platform that would 
be worthy of analysis.  
Although this paper explores the negative impact of the law, the moral motivation behind 
DDS is difficult to argue against. Many law reviews discuss alternatives, such as a royalty fee 
based on public display, that invite economic exploration to approximate potential impacts. The 
question of whether a royalty is beneficial or harmful to the art market is trivial when thinking 
about the big picture. The nature of this issue is more complex because it places the creators of the 
world’s arts and culture livelihood at stake. The motivation behind DDS is not only monetary; the 
premise is driven by a moral code that, some argue, is already built into American philosophy. 
Even if a resale royalty fee does in fact impact the market negatively, the question of society’s 
moral obligation to visual artists remains.  
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